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CLOGS IN THE PIPELINE: THE MIXED DATA ON WOMEN
DIRECTORS AND CONTINUED BARRIERS TO
THEIR ADVANCEMENT
LISA M. F~AiRax*
In 1934, Lettie Pate Whitehead was appointed to the board of
The Coca-Cola Co.1 Reportedly, Mrs. Whitehead was the first woman
appointed to the board of a major corporation.2 Mrs. Whitehead
served on the board for almost twenty years and by all accounts made
a significant contribution to the Coca-Cola board and the corporation
as a whole.' Coincidentally, the year she was appointed not only cor-
responds with the year Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the Exchange Act) ,4 one of the first major federal acts regu-
lating public corporations, but also with the year Congress created the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to oversee that regula-
tion.5 Close to seventy years later, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to
thank Karen Rothenberg, Dean and Marjorie Cook Professor of Law at the University of
Maryland School of Law, for her unconditional support in allowing me to organize the
Symposium on Women and the "New" Corporate Governance. I also would like to thank my co-
organizer, Professor Paula Monopoli as well as all of my other colleagues at Maryland for
their help and support in connection with the Symposium, particularly Richard Booth,
Danielle Citron, and Michael Van Alstine. Additionally, I would like to thank all of the
Symposium participants for their contributions to the panels on which they served and for
their insights and helpful comments on the concepts in this Article. Special thanks to
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr. for his comments on earlier versions of this draft, Todd Phelan for his
invaluable research assistance, and Kristen Baginski for her research support.
1. Ann-Marie Imbornoni et al., Famous Firsts by American Women, http://www.info
please.com/spot/womensfirstsl.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
2. Most people cite Lettie Pate Whitehead as the first woman director of a major
corporation. See, e.g., id. See generally The Lettie Pate Whitehead Foundation, Lettie Pate
Whitehead, http://www.lpwhitehead.org/bio.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2006). However,
there are a few sources indicating that Marjorie Merriweather Post was appointed to the
board of Post in 1914 when she took over as head of that company. Hillwood Museum &
Gardens, Marjorie Merriweather Post, http://www.hillwoodmuseum.org/mmp.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2006).
3. Mrs. Whitehead assumed responsibility of her husband's affairs when he passed
away. The Lettie Pate Whitehead Foundation, supra note 2. Her husband, Joseph White-
head, was one of the two men who secured an exclusive contract to bottle and sell Coca-
Cola throughout the United States. Id. Her responsibilities included serving as chair of
the board of Whitehead Holding Co. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000).
5. Id. § 78d.
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Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley or Act),6 one of the most sweeping
amendments to the Exchange Act. Sarbanes-Oxley supposedly
ushered in an era of "new" corporate governance.
This Article examines the presence and role of women directors
in that new era. This examination draws upon an empirical study on
women directors at Fortune 100 companies that I conducted (the For-
tune 100 Study). 7 Based on that and other studies involving directors,
this Article concludes that while women have made substantial pro-
gress onto boards since 1934 as well as significant contributions to
those boards, they confront considerable barriers to board member-
ship that must be addressed proactively. Indeed, the continued dis-
parity between the percentage of women in the workforce and their
overall board membership not only indicates that women are exper-
iencing significant barriers or clogs in the pipeline from the more
general workforce to corporate boards, but also that the mere passage
of time will not eliminate those clogs. As a consequence, we must
develop affirmative measures to address them. Without such mea-
sures, women may not be able to fully participate in this new corpo-
rate governance era.
Part I of this Article provides evidence of the clogs in the pipeline
to women's board membership by evaluating empirical data on wo-
men directors. This data confirms that women have made considera-
ble progress since 1934, moving from one lone woman director to a
society in which women can be found in boardrooms of the vast ma-
jority of public corporations, particularly Fortune 100 corporations.'
By contrast, the data also reveals that the aggregate number of women
directors appears relatively small when compared against their per-
centages in the workforce and school population.9 Indeed, women
account for nearly half of the labor force, but only about thirteen per-
cent of available board seats at Fortune 500 corporations.10 This dis-
parity exists despite the fact that women have accounted for an
increasingly larger portion of the workforce for decades,1 undermin-
ing the contention that such disparity would decrease over time. Part
I ends by discussing the role of Sarbanes-Oxley on women's advance-
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2002)).
7. See Appendices A-B and accompanying Tables for data and research methodology.
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra notes 31, 33 and accompanying text.
11. See BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR
FORCE: A DATABOOK 1-3 (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2005.
pdf [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE].
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ment into the boardroom and illustrates that while that Act may have
instigated changes in board composition that could have a positive
impact on women's effectiveness in the boardroom, it does not appear
to have encouraged a significant increase in women directors.
Part II examines why the relatively low number of women direc-
tors matters by addressing the contributions women can and do make
on corporate boards. In recent years, several scholars have argued
that gender diversity-defined as including women directors on the
board-can enhance a corporation's performance in a variety of ways,
including enabling corporations to reach out to their increasingly di-
verse customer and client base as well as facilitating the board's ability
to consider a broader range of views when making decisions. Part II
assesses those arguments and demonstrates that while they may have
some merit, they fail to account for factors that limit women's effec-
tiveness on boards.12 Hence, Part II cautions that we should be more
realistic in our expectations of women directors. Nevertheless, Part II
insists that women do appear to play a vital role on corporate boards,
sitting on and often chairing some of the most important board com-
mittees. This role underscores the importance of ensuring that wo-
men have the opportunity to fully participate on corporate boards.
Part III examines reasons for the barriers or clogs in the pipeline
to women's board membership and ultimately argues one critical rea-
son for the sluggish advancement of women on boards is the failure of
women to advance to executive levels within the corporation. Indeed,
the empirical evidence on directors' occupations reveals that the pipe-
line from the workforce to the board primarily flows through corpo-
rate executive suites.i After addressing reasons why women do not
have a significant presence in those suites, Part III proffers some solu-
tions for improving the number of women directors on the board
thereby unclogging the pipeline or encouraging alternative pipelines.
I. THE STATUS OF WOMEN DIRECTORS: A GLASS HALF FULL
OR HALF EMPTY?
The status of women on corporate boards reflects somewhat of a
contradiction. Indeed, the relative disparity between the views em-
bodied within the opening address and keynote speech at Maryland's
Symposium on Women and the "New" Corporate Governance reflects this
12. For a discussion of the business rationales related to racial and ethnic diversity, see
Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost Benefit Analysis of the Business
Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 795.
13. See infra Part III.A.
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contradiction. In her opening address, Sheila Wellington, former
president and CEO of Catalyst Inc., the nation's leading research and
advisory organization regarding women in business, suggested that
women had made relatively little advancement into the highest ranks
of corporate America, including its boards. Given that Wellington
presided over Catalyst when that organization performed its ground-
breaking studies on the positions of women in major corporations,
her suggestion appears to be based on valid empirical evidence. By
contrast, the keynote luncheon speaker, Catherine R. Kinney, the cur-
rent president and co-chief operating officer of the NYSE, observed
that women had made significant strides within corporate America,
pinpointing the success of various women CEOs and board members.
Kinney's own success, as one of the top office holders at the country's
leading stock exchange, lends considerable merit to her observations.
Which view regarding women's presence on corporate boards is most
accurate? This Part reveals the validity of both. It also reveals the
mixed impact Sarbanes-Oxley has had on advancing gender diversity
in the boardroom.
A. The Glass as Half Full
From one perspective, women appear to have a meaningful pres-
ence on corporate boards, and their presence has grown within the
past decade. In 2004, 82% of Fortune 1000 companies reported hav-
ing at least one woman on their board.1 4 This statistic reveals that the
vast majority of major companies have women on their boards. Then
too, the 2004 figure is up from 63% in 1994, a nearly 20% increase
over the last ten years. 5
The Fortune 100 Study indicates that women directors have an
even stronger presence on the boards of top corporations.1 6 The
study found that 97% of such companies (or all but three) have at
least one woman on their board.1 7 Moreover, 68% of such companies
14. KORN/FERRY INT'L, 31ST ANNUAL BOARD OF DIEcoRs STUDY 12 tbl.B (2004) [here-
inafter KoRN/FERRY STUDY]. These statistics are based on data collected from 904 publicly
held companies. Id at 9.
15. Id. at 11. According to the Korn/Feny Study, 63% of Fortune 1000 companies had at
least one woman in 1994, 69% in 1995, 74% in 1999, 74% in 2000, 78% in 2001, 79% in
2002, and 80% in 2003. Id at 11, 12 tbl.B.
16. The Fortune 100 Study found that women held 199 of the available board seats at
Fortune 100 companies. See infra app. A, tbl.A1. Within the next level of companies from
101-250, women held 255 of the available board seats. See infra app. C, tbls.C1, C5.
17. Those corporations are Honeywell International, Inc. (#75), Plains All American
Pipeline, L.P. (#96), and News Corp. (#98). See infra app. B. Within the next level, 93% of
companies have at least one woman on their board. See infra app. C, tbl.C2.
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have two or more women on their boards."8 Thus, close to half of the
Fortune 100 companies have two women directors, fifteen have three
women directors, two have four women directors, two have five wo-
men directors, and two have six women directors.19 At one company,
Albertson's, Inc., women comprise a majority of the board (six out of
eleven) .2o Other studies mirror this strong representation of women
directors at the top tier of Fortune 500 companies. 2'
Moreover, women directors appear to have made considerable
strides within the past five years. Indeed, 45% of women currently
serving as directors of Fortune 100 companiesjoined the board within
the past five years.22 This suggests that corporations are broadening
their director search to include more women. This figure, however,
does not necessarily mean that the total number of women serving on
boards has increased within the last number of years because often
corporations will elect one woman director at the same time that an-
other woman director is retiring. In this regard, many of the women
directors appointed within the past five years appear to be "replace-
ments," and hence their elections did not signal an increase in the
total number of women serving as directors.23 Instead, about 20% of
women currently serving as directors joined their boards within the
last five years and were not replacement directors. 24 Yet even taking
replacement directors into account, the increase in women directors
appears to have gained momentum within the last five years.
Then too, women, and in particular white women, appear to be
faring better than any other disadvantaged group with respect to
board representation. Women of color only account for 3% of the
total available board seats.25 Thus, the vast majority of women board
members are white. In addition, women appear to be better repre-
sented on corporate boards than all people of color combined. Sev-
18. See infra app. A, tbl.A2. This number drops to 54% in the next tier of companies
from 101-250 (representing 80 out of 149 companies). See infra app. C, tbl.C2.
19. See infra app. A, tbl.A2.
20. See infra app. A, tbl.A2.1. At SBC Communications, Inc., the other company with
six directors, women account for six out of fourteen of the directors, almost 43% of the
board. See infta app. A, tbl.A2.1. In the next tier from 101 to 250, there are two companies
where women comprise 40% of the board. See infra app. C, tbl.C5 (indicating that at both
Publix Super Markets, Inc. (#117) and CIGNA Corp. (#122), four out of ten directors are
women).
21. CATALYST INC., 2003 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS 13 app.1
(2003) [hereinafter CATALYST CENSUS OF DIRECTORS] (finding that all of the companies in
the top 100 of Fortune 500 companies had at least one woman director).
22. See infra app. A, tbl.A1.1.
23. See infra app. A, tbl.AI.1.
24. See infra app. A, tbl.Al.1.
25. CATALYST CENSUS OF DIRECTORS, supra note 21, at 8.
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enty-six percent of Fortune 1000 companies report having at least one
person of color on their board, as contrasted to 82% with at least one
woman. 26 The contrast is starker when compared to each minority
group. Only 47% of Fortune 1000 companies have at least one Afri-
can American, 18% of such companies have at least one Latino, and
11% of such companies have at least one Asian. 27 People of color
have experienced more dramatic increases in board representation
within the last decade, with one group doubling and another tripling
its numbers. 28 However, the board representation of these groups
both individually and collectively still lags behind women.
This lag, coupled with the empirical evidence that women appear
to be represented on the boards of most public corporations, supports
the perspective that women directors have made significant strides to-
wards enhancing their presence in the corporate boardroom.
B. The Glass as Half Empty
From another perspective, however, women have not achieved
the gains on corporate boards that one would expect when viewed in
the context of their percentage in the labor force, at colleges, and in
professional schools.
In fact, the total number of available board seats held by women
appears relatively small and has not grown significantly over the years.
The Fortune 100 Study reveals that women hold only about 16% of
available board seats at those companies.29 A 2003 Catalyst study simi-
larly found that women comprised 16% of total Fortune 100 board
seats, suggesting relatively little movement in the past two years.3 0
The overall percentage of board seats held by women declines slightly
when all Fortune 500 companies are taken into account. Hence, in
2003, women held 13.6% of available board seats at Fortune 500 com-
panies as compared to 9.6% in 1995. ' This reflects a mere 4% in-
26. KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 11.
27. Id,
28. In contrast to the 20% increase for women, over the past ten years there has been
more than a 30% increase in the number of companies reporting at least one ethnic mi-
nority on their board, going from 44% in 1994 to 76% in 2004. Id Then too, there were
only 31% of companies with at least one African American on their board in 1994, 9% for
Latinos, and 4% for Asians. Id. Thus, Latinos have doubled their board representation,
while Asians have nearly tripled their numbers. Id.
29. See infra app. A, tbl.A1. Women hold 199 of the 1207 available board seats. See infra
app. A, tbl.A1. Similarly, within the next 150 companies, women hold only 15.7% (or 255
out of 1622) of the total available board seats. See infra app. C, tbl.C1.
30. CATALYST CENSUS OF DiREcroRs, supra note 21, at 1.
31. Id Women held 9.6% of such seats in 1995, 10.2% in 1996, 10.6% in 1997, 11.1%
in 1998, 11.2% in 1999, 11.7% in 2000, 12.4% in 2001, and 13.6% in 2003. Id. at 5 fig.1.
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crease over the course of almost ten years. Then too, women of color
only hold 3% of the board seats at Fortune 500 companies, an in-
crease of only 0.5% since 1999.32 Viewed in this light, women do not
appear to hold a significant number of board seats.
These statistics appear particularly troubling when compared to
the percentage of women in the workforce and at colleges or in pro-
fessional schools. In 2004, women comprised roughly 46% of the U.S.
labor force and held 50% of all managerial and professional posi-
tions.33 In 2004, roughly the same percentage of men and women
between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four were college gradu-
ates.3 4 Then too, in 2001, women earned 57.3% of all bachelor's de-
grees in the United States, 58.5% of all master's degrees, 44.9% of all
doctorates, and 47.3% of all law degrees.3 5 Women also comprise
30% of the student population at business schools.36 The relatively
sharp divide between these percentages and the percentage of women
directors suggests that women are underrepresented on corporate
boards.
This divide is even more alarming when one considers the num-
ber of years women have been in the labor force in significant num-
bers as well as the number of years women have served on boards.3 7
Some may contend that women's presence in the boardroom will im-
prove over time as women gain a consistent presence in the labor
force, suggesting that such a sustained presence will eventually trans-
late into top-tier positions, including those on corporate boards.
However, women's presence in the labor market does not reflect a
new phenomenon. Instead, women have comprised nearly half of the
labor force for at least a decade.3 8
These minute increases reflect the relative lack of progress women directors appear to be
making.
32. Id. at 8.
33. WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 11, at 28 tbl.11.
34. I. at 24-25 tbl.9. In 2004, 32.6% of women and 32.3% of men in that age group
had completed college. Id.
35. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STA-
TISTICS, 2004 tbls.247, 257 (2005), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/
lt3.asp#c3a_- 5.
36. CATALYST INC., WOMEN AND THE MBA: GATEWAY TO OPPORTUNrIY 3 (2000) (noting
that women's enrollment in business schools appears to have plauteued, while their num-
bers at medical and law schools have increased, and explaining possible barriers). Indeed,
women apparently comprise 44% of the law and medical school populations. Id. at 1.
37. See supra notes 1, 33 and accompanying text.
38. WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 11, at 8 tbl.2. Women ages twenty-five to
sixty-four have accounted for roughly 46% of the workforce since 1994. Id. at 24-25 tbl.9.
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By contrast, and during this same period, women appear to have
made at best incremental gains on corporate boards. Like their exis-
tence in the labor force, women's presence on corporate boards is not
a new phenomenon. Yet today, more than seventy years since the first
woman was appointed to a major corporate board,3" women hold only
198 more seats at Fortune 100 companies than they did in 1934, an
average of 2.75 seats a year.'4 To be fair, women did not begin having
a significant presence on corporate boards until the early 1970s,
spurred by the Civil Rights Movement. 41 One study reveals that in
1975, twelve companies currently in the Fortune 100 had at least one
woman director.42 As of June 2005, eight of those companies have
only increased their representation of women directors to two.43
Hence, over the span of thirty years, the bulk of these companies have
only added one additional woman director to their board. This, albeit
limited evidence, corresponds with other studies reflecting a sluggish
increase in the growth of women directors. Catalyst's study of women
directors, for example, reveals that over the course of roughly ten
years, there has only been a 4% increase in the number of board seats
held by women directors, which is less than half a percentage point a
year.44 Apparently, women held 1% of board seats in the late 1970s.45
Like the Catalyst study, this suggests a half a percentage point increase
per year. At that rate, it will be almost seventy years before women's
percentage on boards will reach 50%. When compared to their sus-
tained presence in the labor force, this data undermines the notion
that women's board representation will improve with the passing of
time.
39. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
40. See infra app. A, tbl.A1.
41. See Who Are the Women in the Board Rooms?, Bus. & Soc'Y REV., Winter 1975-76, at 5, 5
(finding 237 companies with women directors in 1975).
42. Id. at 6-10. Those companies were American Telephone and Telegraph Co.
(AT&T); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (DuPont); International Business Machines Corp.
(IBM);J.C. Penney Corp.; Merck & Co. (Merck); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (Met-
Life); Nationwide Corp.; New York Life Insurance Co.; Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Walt Disney
Co.; and Wells Fargo & Co. (Wells Fargo). Id. While certainly both the name and the
structure of these companies have changed throughout the years, they each have had
boards of directors governing the company during those changes. Id.
43. Every company but Wells Fargo (which now has five women directors), Merck, and
MetLife (both of which now have three) have only increased the number of women direc-
tors serving on their boards by two. Compare id. with infra app. B.
44. CATALYST CENSUS OF DIREcrORS, supra note 21, at 5.
45. See Carolyn M. Janiak, The "Links" Among Golf, Networking, and Women's Professional
Advancement, 8 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 317, 320 (2003) (noting that women held one percent
of board seats in 1977).
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C. The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Gender Diversity on the Board
Because women directors tend to be independent directors, some
believed that Sarbanes-Oxley's focus on increasing independent direc-
tors on corporate boards would lead to a rise in the number of women
directors. That Act requires every member of a board's audit commit-
tee to be independent.4 6 The various listing agencies, acting pursuant
to the Act, require a majority of the entire board,47 as well as each
member of the audit committee, nominating committee, and com-
pensation committee, to be independent.48 Studies suggest that wo-
men are more likely to be independent directors than their male
counterparts.49 Illustrative of this point, only four women directors at
Fortune 100 companies are insiders.5 ° By requiring corporations to
achieve greater board independence, Sarbanes-Oxley and related re-
forms could encourage an increase in women directors.
An examination of Fortune 100 companies reveals that Sarbanes-
Oxley may have had a nuanced, but significant impact on women di-
rectors. For instance, twenty-three percent of women directors cur-
rently serving at Fortune 100 companies were appointed after the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.5 1 That figure, representing almost a
quarter of all women directors, does include many replacement direc-
46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. II 2002)).
47. See AM. STOCK EXCHANGE (AMEX), AMEX COMPANY GUIDE § 802 (2005), available
at http://wallstreet.cch.com/AmericanStockExchangeAMEX/AmexCompanyGuide/de-
fault.asp [hereinafter AMEX COMPANY GUIDE]; THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, INC., MAR-
KETPLACE RULES 10, 38 (2004), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Marketplace
Rules.pdf [hereinafter NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES]; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
(NYSE), NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2003), available at http://www.nyse.
com/lcm/lcmsection.html [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL].
48. See AMEX COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 47, §§ 803-805 (audit, compensation, and
nominating committees); NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, supra note 47, at 56-58 (same);
NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 47, §§ 303A.06, 303A.04 (audit and nominating
committees).
49. See, e.g., David Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Per-
formance (March 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Oklahoma State Uni-
versity), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=304499. This
reflects a shift because historically, women directors gained admittance to the boardroom
because their husbands or family members either founded the company or headed the
company, and hence women were inside directors. Who Are the Women in the Board Rooms?,
supra note 41, at 5. Indeed, this was the case with Mrs. Whitehead. See supra note 3. How-
ever, beginning in the 1970s, more women directors were appointed as outside directors.
Some saw this shift as a positive development because it indicated that women were gaining
board seats based on their own accomplishments rather than their familial connections.
See Who Are the Women in the Board Rooms?, supra note 41, at 5.
50. See infra app. A, tbl.A5.
51. See infra app. A, tbl.Al.1. Fortune 100 corporations appointed forty-six women to
their boards after Sarbanes-Oxley. See infra app. A, tbl.Al.1.
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tors and hence does not reflect an aggregate increase in women direc-
tors. However, at the very least it suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley has
encouraged corporations to seek out other women to serve on their
boards and maintain the status quo. Then too, excluding replace-
ment directors, ten percent of Fortune 100 women directors were ap-
pointed as new directors after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.52
This reveals some increase in the total number of women directors
after Sarbanes-Oxley. Moreover, all but one of these new directors
were appointed to boards that already had at least one other woman
director.53 Many scholars believe that women and people of color
need a critical mass in order to overcome tokenism and ensure that
such people feel comfortable voicing their diverse views and perspec-
tives.54 This belief suggests that critical mass may be an important
component of women's effectiveness within the boardroom. The For-
tune 100 Study indicates that by encouraging companies to add to their
existing number of women directors, Sarbanes-Oxley also encourages
companies to achieve a critical mass of women in the boardroom. If
this is true, then Sarbanes-Oxley may have had an important impact
on women board members.
Yet even the changes wrought by Sarbanes-Oxley do not signifi-
cantly decrease the gap between women directors' percentages on the
board and their percentages in the workforce. Korn/Ferry Interna-
tional (Korn/Ferry) reports that the number of Fortune 1000 compa-
nies with at least one woman on their board has only increased by
three percent since the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.55 This appears
to be basically consistent with prior gains.56 However, the percentage
of available board seats held by women at top corporations has re-
mained static. Catalyst reported that in 2003, women held 16% of
board seats at Fortune 100 companies, while the Fortune 100 Study
reveals that women now hold 16.4%, a statistically insignificant in-
crease.57 Ultimately then, the empirical data appears to reveal
52. See infra app. A, tbl.Al.l.
53. Compare infra app. A, tbl.Al.1. (noting twenty-one women directors elected as
nonreplacements from 2003 to 2005), with infta app. A, tbl.1.2 (noting twenty nonreplace-
ment directors elected to boards already having at least one woman director from 2003 to
2005).
54. See infta notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
55. See KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 12 tbl.B (indicating there were 79% of
such companies in 2002-the year Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted-and 82% in 2004).
56. See id. at 12 (noting 74% of companies studied reported at least one woman on
their board in 2000, 78% in 2001, 79% in 2002, 80% in 2003, and 82% in 2004).
57. CATALYST CENSUS OF DIREcroRs, supra note 21, at 1; see infra app. A, tbl.Al.
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Sarbanes-Oxley may be insufficient on its own to facilitate significant
changes in board composition. 58
In sum, Part I suggests that women have made advancements into
the boardroom and also may be experiencing changes at the margin,
but have yet to achieve a level of board service commensurate with
their presence within the labor force and school population. Instead,
the large percentage of women in the workforce and school popula-
tion and the length of time women have sustained that percentage,
supports the notion that women's pipeline to the boardroom appears
to be clogged and that this clog has persisted despite recent reforms.
II. EXAMINING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WOMEN'S SERVICE
ON THE BOARD
Before examining this clog in more detail, this Part evaluates
some of the reasons we should care whether corporations enhance
the number of women directors in the boardroom. This examination
includes an analysis of the so-called business rationales for board di-
versity, which advance economic (as opposed to moral) justifications
for increasing diversity in corporate America. The articulation of such
rationales reflects a concern that moral justifications had proven in-
sufficient to encourage greater diversity within corporations.
A. The Impact of Gender Diversity on Corporate Performance
Recently, several scholars have argued that gender diversity in the
boardroom can improve the effectiveness of corporations in a variety
of ways.59 First, scholars contend that boards that include a significant
number of women and directors of color not only may be better
monitors of corporate affairs, but also may make higher quality deci-
sions. Second, such scholars assert that increased gender diversity on
58. Predicting this result, Thomas Joo argued that while independence requirements
and other Sarbanes-Oxley provisions may create opportunities for directors to increase
board diversity, the fact that boards retain control of the nomination process may enable
them to continue replicating the status quo. Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of
"Corporate Democracy": Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
735, 747 (2003).
59. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of
Directors, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1363, 1403-05 (2002) (noting that diversity on corporate boards
may counter a corporate environment focused exclusively on stock price); Marleen A.
O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306-08
(2003) ("[D]iversity may enhance board effectiveness."); Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and
the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 109-10 (2000) (outlining the business rationales
for diversity on the board and within corporations more generally); Janis Sarra, The Gender
Implications of Corporate Governance Change, I SEATrLE J. Soc. JusT. 457, 494 (2002) (noting
that "[d]iversity can enhance corporate governance" in a variety of ways).
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the board may limit the number and severity of costly harassment and
discrimination suits. Third, those scholars argue that gender diversity
may improve the corporations' ability to reach out to diverse employ-
ees and customers, enhancing their overall profitability. This Section
discusses both the merits and shortcomings of these arguments.
Indeed, there exists some support for such arguments. First, in
asserting that diversity enhances a board's monitoring and decision-
making capabilities, scholars rely on social science literature regard-
ing group behavior as well as studies of board dynamics. This litera-
ture reveals that homogenous groups tend toward excessive
conformity that undercuts their ability to sharply assess other group
members.6 ° In fact, studies of small group behavior reveal that groups
comprised of solely one gender tend to stake out more extreme posi-
tions.61 Social science literature further demonstrates that because
members of homogenous groups share the same background and ex-
periences, the group as a whole has a narrower perspective, which pre-
vents the group from considering a fuller spectrum of alternatives
when making decisions.62 Adding greater diversity to the group coun-
teracts these shortcomings.6 3
Applying this literature to boards, scholars insist that boards with
gender and racial diversity may reduce the board's tendency to con-
form, thereby enhancing the board's ability to closely scrutinize board
and managerial decisions.64 In fact, studies of the Enron board sug-
gest that its homogeneity (there was only one woman director) may
have caused the board to gravitate towards excessive conformity,
thereby impeding its ability to critically monitor and assess corporate
affairs.65 Scholars also maintain that the range of backgrounds and
views associated with gender and racial diversity on boards enables the
entire board to consider a wider range of options and solutions to
corporate issues." That consideration facilitates higher quality deci-
sions. By improving the board's ability to monitor corporate conduct,
as well as its tendency to generate high quality decisions, scholars ar-
gue that gender diversity enhances the board's overall effectiveness.
Second, scholars assert that diversity in the boardroom may re-
duce the social and economic costs associated with discrimination and
60. O'Connor, supra note 59, at 1261-62.
61. Id. at 1309.
62. Id. at 1262.
63. See id. at 1309 (noting that studies evaluating mixed-gender groups avoid problems
associated with "groupthink").
64. E.g., Ramirez, supra note 59, at 99.
65. O'Connor, supra note 59, at 1306 n.423.
66. E.g., id. at 1308-09; Dallas, supra note 59, at 1403.
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harassment in the workforce.67 As several recent cases reveal, those
costs include the possibility of hundreds of millions of dollars ex-
pended to settle racial or sexual harassment lawsuits.6" Because there
is a strong possibility that women may have experience with them, wo-
men directors may have a better understanding of the issues other
women and people of color confront in the workplace.69 Thus, a
board that includes women may be better equipped to respond and
resolve those issues, thereby reducing the incidences or at least the
severity of diversity conflicts and the costly problems resulting from
those conflicts.
Third, scholars assert that gender and ethnic diversity in the boar-
droom may enhance a corporation's bottom line by enabling corpora-
tions to reach out to the increasingly diverse customers, clients, and
employees that today's corporations serve.7" The world is becoming
increasingly more diverse. Some argue that diverse boards will enable
corporations to create employment policies that take such diversity
into account, leading to increased employee satisfaction and hence
less turnover.7 " One study found that corporations with a significant
number of women in management and on their boards are more
likely to adopt flexible work and family life policies.72 Other studies
demonstrate that employees with supportive workplaces are the most
satisfied with their jobs.7" This satisfaction translates into reduced
67. E.g., Ramirez, supra note 59, at 108-09.
68. See, e.g., id, (discussing racial discrimination cases); Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Gov-
ernance as Corporate Social Responsibility: Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REv.
1461, 1468-69 (2002) (same); Cheryl L. Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy on Women
and People of Color, 7J. GENDER RACE &JuST. 213, 225 (2003) (discussing costs of discrimina-
tion to companies).
69. See Edward S. Adams, Using Evaluations to Break Down the Male Corporate Hierarchy: A
Full Circle Approach, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 117, 165-66 (2002) (suggesting women may em-
pathize with other women and people of color, making them more sensitive to a diverse
workforce); Sarra, supra note 59, at 479 (arguing that one result of corporate boards being
dominated by men is that the gender implications of their decisions are not on their radar
screens).
70. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 59, at 1403-05 (describing how corporations can use
diverse board members, including women, to foster better relationships with various stake-
holders); Sarra, supra note 59, at 489 (noting that gender diversity on boards may help
corporations better assess the costs and benefits of corporate decisions).
71. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 59, at 1384-85 (stating that diversity on corporate boards
may "sensitize the corporation to the interests of employees and consumers in an increas-
ingly diverse, global society").
72. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & D. JEANNE PATTERSON, CONFERENCE BD., BOARD DIVERSrY
IN U.S. CORPORATIONS: BEST PRACTICES FOR BROADENING THE PROFILE OF CORPORATE
BoARDs 8 (1999).
73. E.g., James K_ Harter et al., Business-Unit-Level Relationship Between Empkyee Satisfac-
tion, Employee Engagement, and Business Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis, 87J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 268
(2002).
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turnover among such employees as well as a reduction in the costs
associated with that turnover.7 ' Diverse boards also may be better able
to identify with different communities, enabling such boards to tap
the market power of those communities. 75 Hence, it is reputed that
the first woman director at Nike, Inc., Jill Kerr Conway, encouraged
her fellow board members to begin marketing to women, a campaign
that has proven to be extremely profitable.76
Buttressing these arguments, there is some empirical support for
the proposition that gender diversity on boards enhances corporate
performance. A recent Catalyst study found a link between compa-
nies with high representations of women in their management (de-
fined as women corporate officers and top earners) and financial
performance. 77 Measuring financial performance by return on equity
and total return to shareholders, that study found that companies with
the highest representation of women managers experienced better fi-
nancial performance than those with a low number of women manag-
ers. 78 This result remained largely constant both for the total group
of companies analyzed and when Catalyst analyzed companies by in-
dustry.79 Although not specific to boards, this study provides impor-
tant support for the notion that women directors may enhance a
corporation's economic performance.
This study and arguments in support of gender diversity suggest
that corporations should be concerned with the lack of such diversity
on their board because it could have economic consequences.
However, there are some flaws in the business-related arguments
for diversity, and those flaws suggest that advocates may have over-
stated women's ability to enhance corporate performance. First, a va-
riety of factors may limit the impact women directors can have on
improving the board's decision-making and monitoring functions. In
fact, increased diversity may foster less cohesiveness on boards.8 °
From this perspective, corporations must manage board diversity so
that differences among directors do not undermine the entire board's
74. Id. at 273-74.
75. See O'Connor, supra note 59, at 1308 (noting that corporations desire women direc-
tors for purposes of "market reciprocity").
76. Nike's female sports-apparel division now accounts for a significant segment of
Nike's overall revenue. See Carol Hymowitz, Corporate Boards Lack Gender, Racial Equality,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, July 9, 2003, http://www.careerjournal.com/columnists/inthelead/20
030709-inthelead.html.
77. CATALYST INC., THE BOTTOM LINE: CONNECTING CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND GEN-
DER DIVERsIry 1 (2004).
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id.
80. Joo, supra note 58, at 743.
[VOL. 65:579
2006] WOMEN DIRECTORS & BARRIERS TO THEIR ADVANCEMENT 593
ability to work together effectively.8' Then too, a lack of critical mass
of women board members may prevent such directors from expres-
sing their diverse viewpoints.82 Some studies reveal that gender does
not impact group decision-making until the number of women in the
group rises above twenty percent.8 3 Indeed, a single woman board
member may not feel comfortable expressing divergent views, under-
mining her ability to facilitate a consideration of broader perspectives
in the boardroom.84 In this regard, the possibility that Sarbanes-Oxley
may encourage multiple directors on boards may buttress women's
ability to enhance a corporation's effectiveness. Then too, the fact
that most Fortune 100 boards have more than one woman director
suggests that those companies may have a sufficient number of wo-
men on the board to ensure that those women feel comfortable exer-
cising their voices. Even if this is true, however, corporations tend to
draw their women directors from the same social and professional
backgrounds as men. 5 This tendency limits the extent to which wo-
men directors' views or experiences will be significantly different from
their male counterparts, thereby limiting the extent of their actual
diversity. 6 These factors suggest that advocates may have overstated
women's ability to facilitate diverse discussions and more critical
thinking in the boardroom.
Also, women board members may be limited in their ability to
reduce incidences of discriminatory or harassing behavior in the
workforce and their attendant costs. Studies reveal that such reduc-
tion requires systematic changes in the corporate environment.8 7
While certainly women directors may play a role in implementing
those changes, directors (both male and female), whose roles are pri-
marily limited to oversight of officers and their policies, cannot serve
as the sole means for instituting such changes. Like those involving
the benefits of diverse viewpoints, this observation suggests that advo-
cates may have overstated, and even oversimplified, the ability of wo-
81. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 59, at 1310 ("[S]ome level of collegiality . . .pro-
motes a well-functioning board.").
82. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003) (observing that a critical mass of
minorities ensures that students of color feel comfortable expressing their divergent
views).
83. E.g., O'Connor, supra note 59, at 1309.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1310.
86. See id. at 1309-10 (explaining that boards appoint women with shared backgrounds,
which fails to create heterogeneity); Sarra, supra note 59, at 487 (noting that women are
likely to be drawn from the same privileged class as current directors and hence may not
generate the wider diversity of views that enhance corporate governance).
87. E.g., Sarra, supra note 59, at 485.
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men directors to provide these litigation-related economic benefits to
the corporation.
Additionally, some recent scholarship suggests that women who
rise to the highest levels within the corporation may be the least likely
to promote changes in the corporate environment, particularly
changes related to diversity concerns. Indeed, Devon Carbado and
Mitu Gulati explain that corporate officials tend to promote people of
color who are racially palatable and demonstrate a willingness to
subordinate their group identity.88 These characteristics are particu-
larly important for managers of color because they must be perceived
as having the capacity to manage whites without making them uncom-
fortable. 9 In this way, the corporation's promotion system screens
out those people of color who exhibit racial differences and a ten-
dency to challenge the status quo.9° Because of this system, Carbado
and Gulati conclude that the type of people of color most likely to be
promoted within corporations is not likely to promote the interests of
other people of color.9
This conclusion appears applicable to women. Consistent with
Carbado and Gulati's assessment of corporate promotions systems,
studies reveal that while thirty-nine percent of women executives be-
lieve that men have difficulty being managed by women,9 2 forty-seven
percent of women claim they have succeeded into top positions by
developing a management style that makes men comfortable.93 This
suggests that those women who get the farthest ahead may be most
adept at generating such comfort and hence least likely to advance
policies (such as those that realistically address racial and gender is-
sues in the work place) that undermine or alter men's comfort zone.
Certainly we should not discount those women who do get ahead and
make important changes in the workforce. However, Carbado and
88. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What
Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1676-77 (2004) [hereinafter
Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top]; Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Econom-
ics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1798-1802 (2003) (book review) [hereinafter
Carbado & Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory].
89. See Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 88, at 1675-76 (arguing that firms
hire minorities based on their ability to work in a corporate team).
90. See Carbado & Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, supra note 88, at
1802-03 (arguing that firms hire racially palatable minorities).
91. Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 88, at 1672-73, 1692.
92. CATALYST INC., WOMEN IN U.S. CORPORATE LEADERSHIP: 2003, at 10-11 (2003)
[hereinafter WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP].
93. Id. at 13. This number is down from sixty-one percent. Id. Another forty-nine
percent of those women maintain that they have succeeded by successfully managing
others. Id.
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Gulati suggest a need to be more cautious when assessing women's
ability to alter discriminatory behavior in the workforce, particularly
because that alteration involves significant costs and effort that wo-
men directors cannot be expected to bear on their own.94
This kind of suggestion reveals that arguments touting women's
ability to contribute to corporate performance may have been exag-
gerated because they fail to account for those factors limiting women's
ability to achieve some of the economic benefits of diversity. Never-
theless, these arguments do have some merit, indicating that under
the right circumstances, gender diversity on the board can translate
into economic advantages for the corporation. In fact, some boards
may have obtained a critical mass of women directors, not only ena-
bling those directors to express divergent views in the boardroom with
comfort, but also allowing the entire board's decision-making respon-
sibilities to benefit from considering those views. Then too, there is
some evidence that women may generate supportive employment pol-
icies as well as marketing strategies that enable the company to tap
into the market power of different consumers. Finally, it is possible
that as more women assume management positions, their need to
make other men comfortable may subside, lessening the notion that
such women may not advance agendas that involve diversity measures.
In fact, the number of women who believe that making men feel com-
fortable represents a key strategy for success declined from sixty-one
percent in 1996 to forty-seven percent in 2003."5 That kind of decline
suggests that over time women may feel more comfortable addressing
gender-specific issues in a way that reduces workforce conflicts involv-
ing race or gender. If this occurs, women directors could have a sig-
nificant impact on the corporation's profitability. These advantages
suggest that when corporations fail to capitalize on women board
members, that failure may negatively impact their economic bottom
line.
B. The Moral Importance of Gender Diversity
Aside from the possibility that gender diversity will enhance cor-
porate performance, ensuring a more representative number of wo-
men directors in the boardroom has an important moral significance.
At base, having a boardroom that better reflects women's participa-
tion in the workforce is the right thing to do. Further, it sends a posi-
94. Cf Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 88, at 1692-93 (urging legal reform
in light of the struggles racial minorities face while rising within a corporation).
95. WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 13.
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tive message to other women in the workforce. For women in the
rank and file as well as the broader society, when corporations have a
significant number of women board members, those numbers suggest
the attainability of such positions. Given the historical barriers (dis-
criminatory and otherwise) to women in the workforce, and the con-
tinued gender gap in pay, particularly among top executives,96 there is
certainly a need for corporations to signal such attainability. Then
too, when the number of women on boards better reflects their repre-
sentation in society it suggests that women directors are not mere to-
kens, but rather are being valued for their individual contributions.
In this regard, the failure of boards to better reflect the representa-
tion of women in the workforce is especially problematic because it
suggests the continued strength of discriminatory barriers and that
women are being treated as tokens.
C. Some Evidence on Women's Contributions to Corporate Boards
Assessing women's roles on Fortune 100 boards indicates that wo-
men do make meaningful contributions to the corporate boards on
which they serve. Indeed, women serve on some of the most work-
intensive committees of the board.97 The Fortune 100 Study indicates
that the audit committee is the most common committee on which
women serve.98 Sixty percent of Fortune 100 companies have at least
one woman serving on their audit committee.99 The significance of
women's tendency to serve on audit committees should not be mini-
mized. Indeed, the audit committee is the only board committee spe-
96. Studies reveal that women executives earn about forty-five percent less compensa-
tion than men. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Kevin F. Hallock, The Gender Gap in Top
Corporate Jobs, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 3, 3 (2001). A lot of this is attributed to the fact
that women manage smaller companies and were less likely to be the president or CEO.
Id. at 17. When those title differences are taken into account, the gap falls to less than five
percent. Id.
97. Because corporations use a variety of different names to refer to their committees,
the Fortune 100 Study uses specific committee names to refer to the committee's primary
function, rather than the actual committee name a corporation uses. For example, even
when some corporations use the name "audit and finance committee," the Fortune 100
Study will deem such committee an audit committee if its primary function is to oversee
accounting, auditing, and financial reporting of a company with a focus on ensuring com-
pliance with Sarbanes-Oxley.
98. See infra app. A, tbl.A3. Thus, the greatest number of women, seventy-four, serve on
the audit committee, while sixty-five women serve on the compensation committee. See
infra app. A, tbl.A3. This same pattern holds true for the next 150 Fortune companies
where 116 women serve on the audit committee and seventy-one serve on the compensa-
tion committee. See infra app. C, tbl.C3.
99. See infra app. A, tbl.A3.1.
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cifically regulated by Sarbanes-Oxley.'a° That Act focuses on the audit
committee because of that committee's perceived importance to en-
suring a corporation's financial accountability. The Act makes audit
committee members responsible for overseeing the work of their com-
pany's outside auditors, including resolving disputes between the au-
ditors and management.' t Reflecting this responsibility, audit
committee members report the highest increase in time commitment
resulting from Sarbanes-Oxley relative to other committee members.
In fact, audit committee members have almost doubled the average
number of hours spent in committee meetings. 102 This reflects the
greater time and responsibility such members must devote to their
jobs relative to other committee members. When viewed in this con-
text, the fact that the audit committee is the most common committee
on which women sit illustrates the importance of their contribution to
the board.
The Fortune 100 Study also reveals that women have leadership
roles on the board. More than a quarter or twenty-seven percent of
Fortune 100 women directors chair a committee on the board. 0 3
Committee chairs preside over committee meetings and receive a re-
tainer for their service as a chair in addition to the standard commit-
tee retainer and fee other committee members receive.'0 4 Their role
as chairs further reflects women's contribution to the boards on which
they serve.
Unfortunately, only two women serve in "top" leadership posi-
tions on the board. The Fortune 100 Study revealed one woman chair
of the board,"0 5 and one woman lead director-the director who eval-
100. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. II 2002)).
101. Id.
102. KoRN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 14. According to the Korn/Ferny Study, audit
committee members meet an average of eight times per year, while other committee mem-
bers only tend to meet four or five times a year. Id. at 15 tbl.E.
103. See infra app. A, tbl.A3.1. Women hold fifty-four chairs of board committees. Id.
Similarly, women hold fifty-five chairs of board committees within the next 150 Fortune
companies. See infra app. C, tbl.C3.
104. KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 18. By far the chair of the audit committee
receives the largest. The average audit committee chair received a retainer of $10,317 in
2004, up from $5,779 in 2002. Id. at 18 tl.H. Hence, retainers for such chairs have
doubled since the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, presumably reflecting the increased
amount of work and responsibility such chairs must undertake.
105. See infra app. A, tbl.A5. The Fortune 100 Study found that Hewlett-Packard Co. is the
only Fortune 100 company with a woman as chair of the board. See Hewlett-Packard Co.,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 16 (Feb. 11, 2005) (identifying Patricia C. Dunn
as non-executive chairman of the board since February 8, 2005). Of course Hewlett-Pack-
ard Co. is also the only current Fortune 100 company previously headed by a woman. See
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uates the CEO and presides over the board in executive sessions.10 6
These miniscule numbers indicate that women directors have not yet
ascended to the top ranks of the board.
Taken together, however, this Part reveals that when women
serve on boards, they can and do make their presence felt. There is
some, albeit controvertible, evidence that having women directors im-
proves a corporation's corporate performance because gender diver-
sity generates economic advantages both to the board and the
corporation as a whole. Then too, ensuring that corporations have a
sufficient number of women directors has a moral significance for
other women employees and women within the broader society. Fi-
nally, through their service on critical committees, women make im-
portant contributions to the board. Corporations miss out on these
contributions when they overlook women directors. More impor-
tantly, these contributions illustrate the need to ensure that women
have greater access to corporate boards.
III. CLOGS IN THE PIPELINE AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR
UNCLOGGING THEM
Part I reveals that women represent about half of the labor force
and managerial positions and that representation has been relatively
constant for almost a decade." 7 They also appear to be relatively well
represented in professional schools. Yet they have not found their way
onto corporate boards in sufficiently high numbers, apparently exper-
iencing a barrier to that ascension. Part II demonstrates why corpora-
tions and society in general should be concerned with that barrier.
This Part pinpoints one significant reason for the clog in the pipeline
to more women directorships and offers some solutions to dissolving
that clog.
infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly
Fiorina).
106. See KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 27 (documenting that eighty percent of
companies have a lead director-a dramatic rise from thirty-two percent prior to Sarbanes-
Oxley). Carla A. Hills at Chevron/Texaco Corp. served as its lead director. Chevron,
Board of Directors, Carla A. Hills, http://www.chevron.com/about/company-profile/
boardbio-hills.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
107. See XW OMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 11, at 8 tbl.2. In 1995, women ac-
counted for 46.1% of the labor force, while they accounted for 46.4% in 2004. Id. at 7-8, 8
tbl.2. Similarly, women held 43.8% of managerial and professional jobs in 1996 and now
hold 50.3%. Id. at 28; Adams, supra note 69, at 147-48.
[VOL. 65:579
2006] WOMEN DIREcToRs & BARRIERS TO THEIR ADVANCEMENT 599
A. Impediments to Women Directors' Success
Corporations tend to draw their board members from particular
portions of corporate America. By statute, corporations are free to
determine their own qualifications for directors,10 8 and most corpora-
tions delegate this function to the board's nominating committee.10 9
Hence, corporate statutes grant nominating committees the freedom
to determine the criteria of each board member. Despite this free-
dom, most corporations appear to adopt the same general criteria
when selecting directors. Illustrative of this similarity, ninety-five per-
cent of Fortune 1000 companies report having a retired executive on
their board, while eighty-two percent of such companies have a CEO
or chief operating officer (COO) of another company on their
board." 0
This dominance of executives as board members applies, though
to a lesser extent, regardless of the director's gender. Sixty percent of
Fortune 100 companies with women directors have at least one wo-
man who was a current or former CEO, COO, or president. 1 ' Then
too, such executives are by far the most common occupation of wo-
men directors. Indeed, forty-seven percent of Fortune 100 women di-
rectors are either current or former CEOs, COOs, or presidents.'l 2
This data reveals that the search for women directors involves a search
for women executives.
Unfortunately, that search will not yield significant results. One
might presume that if women account for fifty percent of all manage-
rial positions, then corporations would have ample candidates from
which to choose. However, that percentage is deceptive because it
accounts for positions ranging from an administrator to a CEO.113 In-
deed, studies reveal that women who serve as managers within various
companies tend to occupy a disproportionate share of lower-level
108. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.02 (2002) (allowing corporations to identify require-
ments for directors in their articles of incorporation or their bylaws).
109. Since Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment, the percentage of corporations with formal
nominating committees has increased from eighty-seven percent to ninety-six percent.
KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 12. This represents an increase from seventy-three
percent in 1995. Id. at 13 tl.C.
110. Id. at 12. The Korn/Ferry Study notes that the number of current executives has
decreased slightly, suggesting that such current officers may be less suited to board mem-
bership because of the increased time commitments required by Sarbanes-Oxley. Id.
111. See infra app. A, tbl.A4.1.
112. See infra app. A, tbl.A4; see also infra app. C, tbl.C4 (indicating that forty-six percent
of women directors of Fortune 101-250 boards are either current or former CEOs, COOs,
or presidents).
113. Adams, supra note 69, at 147-48.
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managerial positions.' 4 A more tailored assessment of women at the
highest levels of the corporation reveals a more limited pool. In 2002,
only 15.7% of corporate officers in the Fortune 500 were women." 5
Additionally, women hold only 9.9% of line position corporate offices
in Fortune 500 companies, positions which involve jobs with profit
and loss responsibility.1 16 Only 7.9% of women hold the highest titles
within a corporation such as CEO, president, COO, and Executive
Vice President.1 17 Then too, only 5.2% of women represent top earn-
ers, whose earnings serve as a key indicator of executive status.' 18 Fi-
nally, Fortune's 2005 survey revealed nine Fortune 500 companies run
by women and nineteen Fortune 1000 companies headed by wo-
men.119 With the ousting of Carleton Fiorina as CEO of Hewlett-Pack-
ard,1 20 none of those women head companies in the current Fortune
100.121 Because boards rely on this pool to select directors, this
dearth of women in the executive ranks explains the relatively low
level of women serving on boards. Indeed, the fact that the percent-
ages of women in top offices better reflects their percentage in the
boardroom reveals that once women reach the top of the corporate
ladder they make a relatively smooth transition onto boards. This rev-
elation underscores the notion that women's failure to reach the top
impedes their ability to improve their numbers of directorships.
Scholars point to many reasons for this failure. Possibly the domi-
nant reason identified is women's lack of requisite experience. In-
deed, a 2003 study of executives in Fortune 1000 companies found
that forty-seven percent of women executives believed they were held
114. E.g., Bertrand & Hallock, supra note 96, at 7-9.
115. CATALYST INC., 2002 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN CORPORATE OFFICERS AND Top
EARNERS OF THE FORTUNE 500, at 3 (2002) [hereinafter CENSUS OF WOMEN CORPORATE OF-
FICERS AND Top EARNERS]. This reflects a 7% increase from 1995 when women held 8.7%
of such positions. Id.; WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 1.
116. WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 1-2.
117. See CENSUS OF WOMEN CORPORATE OFFICERS AND Top EARNERS, supra note 115, at 12.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Fortune 500, Women CEOs of Fortune 500 Companies, http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/womenceos/ (last visitedJan. 20, 2006). The nine women
are Brenda C. Barnes at Sara Lee Corp. (#114), S. Marce Fuller at Mirant Corp. (#424),
Susan M. Ivey at Reynolds American, Inc. (#321), Andrea Jung at Avon Products, Inc.
(#278), Anne Mulcahy at Xerox Corp. (#132), Patricia F. Russo at Lucent Technologies,
Inc. (#247), Mary F. Sammons at Rite Aid Corp. (#128), Marion 0. Sandler at Golden West
Financial Corp. (#435), and Eileen Scott at Pathmark Stores, Inc. (#467). Id.
120. SeeJohn Markoff, Shake-Up at Hewlett: The Departing Chief; When + Adds Up to Minus,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at CI (noting that Fiorina was the first woman to head one of the
nation's top twenty public companies); Gary Rivlin & John Markoff, Tossing Out a Chief
Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at Cl.
121. Fortune 500, supra note 119. At a company ranked #114, Brenda C. Barnes of Sara
Lee Corp. heads the highest ranked Fortune 500 company. Id.
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back by lack of significant general management or line experience,
which refers to revenue generating or profit and loss responsibility.122
Moreover, this statistic has remained constant since 1996 when the
exact same percentage of women reported that the lack of such expe-
rience undermined their ability to advance. 12' By comparison, sixty-
eight percent of CEOs contend that women are impeded by their lack
of significant general management or line experience. 124 While their
perceptions may differ, it still represents the primary reason identified
by both (mainly male) CEOs and women as holding women back
from top managementjobs. As Catalyst points out, "line experience is
widely considered essential for rising to the rank of CEO. 125
Another reason identified by both women and CEOs as impeding
women's ability to make it to the top of the corporate ladder is the
lack of mentoring relationships and networking opportunities. 126
These concepts are linked because networking opportunities "facili-
tate[ ] the development of mentoring relationships."1 27 Also, devel-
oping important relationships through network and mentoring
opportunities can aid women in getting assignments that will enhance
their managerial experience, and hence these opportunities may miti-
gate that lack of experience for women employees.128 However, forty-
one percent of women executives contend that exclusion from infor-
mal networks hold women back from top management positions. 29
Thirty-seven percent of CEOs believe women are held back by the fail-
ure of senior leadership to assume accountability for women's ad-
vancement. 3 ° Both of these statements essentially reflect the notion
that women have not had access to networks or mentors that can facil-
itate their success within the corporation. Moreover, Catalyst insists
that the lack of key mentoring relationships acts as a significant bar-
rier to women's advancement.13 '
Executives also pinpoint stereotyping regarding women's roles
and positions as impairing women's success.' 3 2 Indeed, forty-six per-
cent of women contend that gender-based stereotypes about their
122. See WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 16.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 25.
125. CENSUS OF WOMEN CORPORATE OFFICERS AND Top EARNERS, supra note 115, at 2.
126. WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 16, 25.
127. Janiak, supra note 45, at 324. Janiak also notes that networking can reduce stere-
otyping. Id,
128. Id.
129. WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 16.
130. Id. at 25.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Id. at 16; Janiak, supra note 45, at 322.
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roles in the corporation hindered their own advancement.' Thirty-
three percent of women believe that such stereotypes reflect a barrier
to women's advancement more generally. 134 Interestingly, only twelve
percent of CEOs believe that stereotypes and preconceptions about
women hinder women's ability to advance.1 35 Arguably this gap in the
opinions of CEOs and women may reflect part of the problem be-
cause it suggests that (mainly male) CEOs may be unaware of the ste-
reotypes they harbor.' 36 Such lack of awareness makes addressing the
problem especially difficult.
1 3 7
Regardless of the reason, because corporations rely on the execu-
tive pipeline to fill their board seats, women's failure to achieve mean-
ingful representation within the top levels of corporate America
hampers their progress onto corporate boards.
B. Possible Solutions for Enhancing Women Directors
This Section considers several methods for increasing the num-
ber of women directors. These methods are offered with the recogni-
tion that the problems women face in advancing within the corporate
ranks and onto boards are complex and hence need to be attacked on
a multitude of fronts.
1. Removing Impediments to Success.-
a. Antidiscrimination Laws.-One solution for enhancing the
number of women directors may be to rely on antidiscrimination laws
to reduce barriers in their advancement to higher levels within the
corporation. Given that women pinpoint stereotyping as one barrier
to their success, reliance on such laws may serve to remove that bar-
rier. The Supreme Court has identified sex stereotyping as an imper-
missible form of discrimination.3 8 Moreover, scholars assert that
promotion decisions are uniquely vulnerable to stereotyping because
they rely on subjective considerations. 3 This assertion confirms the
133. WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 19.
134. Id. at 25.
135. Id.
136. Janiak, supra note 45, at 321.
137. Id.
138. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (explaining that in for-
bidding sex discrimination, "Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
rate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes").
139. See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of
Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 494 (1990) (noting that women are associated with negative
stereotypes); Tracy Anbinder Baron, Comment, Keeping Women out of the Executive Suite: The
Court's Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 267, 275 (1994)
(arguing that women must deal with stereotyping to succeed at upper-level jobs).
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notion that such stereotyping may impede women's ability to reach
the upper levels of corporate America. However, reliance on antidis-
crimination laws may prove ineffective in getting to the root of the
problem. In fact, scholars claim that these laws have experienced lim-
ited success in combating sex discrimination in the workforce.1 4 °
Such scholars pinpoint many reasons for that limited success includ-
ing difficulties with proof of such claims.14 Moreover, while such laws
may eradicate the more obvious forms of gender discrimination, they
may be ill-suited to combat the more subtle forms of bias that serve to
hinder women's promotion into executive jobs.142 There are also
those who contend that strategies to eradicate discrimination based
on litigation may be ineffective not only because women may be reluc-
tant to bring discrimination claims, 43 but also because litigation may
make the work environment more hostile for women. 44 Finally, liti-
gation as a strategy is reactionary and we need to be proactive in ad-
dressing problems associated with women's progress. In this regard,
reliance on antidiscrimination laws may be an unsuitable (or at least
limited) solution for unclogging the pipelines for women board
members.
b. Mentoring and Networking Opportunities.-Another solution
for increasing the number of women directors may involve focusing
on enhancing mentoring and networking opportunities for women.
Women continually cite the absence of informal networks and influ-
ential mentors as a key stumbling block to their success. 45 Indeed,
Catalyst found that only twenty-three percent of women executives re-
port being satisfied with the availability of mentors, while another fifty-
seven percent of women executives contend that they are not satisfied
with their opportunities to network with influential clients and col-
leagues.146 Moreover, sixty percent of the women in the Catalyst study
140. E.g., Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Anal-
ysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 61 (1986); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex
Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1311 (1989); Baron, supra note 139; see also Carlo A.
Pedrioli, A New Image in the Looking Glass: Faculty Mentoring Invitational Rhetoric, and the
Second-Class Status of Women in U.S. Academia, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 192-96 (2004)
(noting limits in anti-discrimination laws in furthering progress of women in academia).
141. E.g., Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 140, at 61; Baron, supra note 139, at 288-98.
142. Baron, supra note 139, at 271-80.
143. Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 140, at 61.
144. Linda Stamato, Dispute Resolution and the Glass Ceiling: Ending Sexual Discrimination at
the Top, Disp. RESOL. J., Feb. 2000, at 25, 29.
145. WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 7-8; Janiak, supra note 45, at
322-24.
146. WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 7.
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had no mentor.' 47 This lack of mentors is especially problematic for
women because they often do not have access to other informal net-
works that may enhance their ability to advance.14 In addition to
helping women advance up the ladder, mentoring relationships may
assist with counteracting gender stereotypes, thereby facilitating in the
reduction of other barriers to women's success.' 4 9 Unfortunately,
generating those networks and mentor relationships involves a host of
problems that have not yet been resolved. Of particular concern are
the difficulties with cross-gender mentoring, which obviously need to
be overcome given that most top-level executives are men. 151 Al-
though it is beyond the scope of this Article to pinpoint the various
methods for generating mentoring and networking opportunities,
there is considerable literature with regard to such issues."' 1
With respect to board membership, this Article would add to that
literature by noting that women must develop strategies for including
within their circle of mentors men and women who have served or are
currently serving as a director. Such mentors are particularly impor-
tant because directors control the nomination process and hence can
be instrumental in ensuring that people they know are allowed to
serve on a board. Indeed, directors appear to share the same social
and professional backgrounds. Hence, women must be part of that
background in larger numbers if they hope to gain entry onto corpo-
rate boards.
c. Women Entrepreneurs.-Alternatively, we may consider
more stringently encouraging women to start their own businesses in
an effort to buttress the executive pipeline. Admittedly, encouraging
women to embark on their own business ventures may undermine any
efforts to increase the presence of women in the highest ranks of ma-
jor corporations. However, it also creates an alternative pipeline for
women directors. While they may not necessarily have exposure to
issues involving large public companies, women who operate their
own businesses may gain the kind of line experience necessary to
147. Id. at 8.
148. Id.
149. Janiak, supra note 45, at 322-24.
150. See id. at 325 (identifying this difficulty as the "similarity principle").
151. See id. at 328 (suggesting golf as a networking opportunity); see also SHEILA WELLING-
TON & CATALYST, BE YOUR OWN MENTOR: STRATEGIES FROM Top WOMEN ON THE SECRETS OF
SUCCESS (2001); Kathy E. Kram, Phases of the Mentor Relationship, 26 ACAD. MGMT. J. 608
(1983); Pedrioli, supra note 140, at 199-201 (explaining the benefits of institutional
mentoring); Pamela J. Smith, Failing to Mentor Sapphire: The Actionability of Blocking Black
Women from Initiating Mentoring Relationships, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 373, 381-88 (2000)
(describing the mentoring relationship).
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make them viable board candidates. Statistics suggest that women-
owned businesses reflect a fertile pipeline. In 2004, forty-seven per-
cent of privately held companies in the United States were fifty per-
cent or more owned by women. 152 The increase in women-owned
businesses may reflect a conscious strategy. Catalyst studies reveal that
women tend to move out of corporations and begin their own busi-
nesses because they experience a glass ceiling or are seeking a more
flexible and better work environment.153 If diversity advocates focus
corporations' attention on these women as potential board candi-
dates, they may be able to overcome the contention that women have
insufficient executive experience to parlay into board representation.
This means that reliance on this strategy depends upon women's abil-
ity to network so that this other pipeline can come to the attention of
corporations and their nominating committees.
2. Expanding the Criteria for Directors.-Given that corporations
have the flexibility to determine the characteristics of their board
members, another solution for increasing the number of women avail-
able to serve as directors could involve pressuring corporations to ex-
pand the criteria they use to ascertain qualified board members.
Some presumed that Sarbanes-Oxley would encourage an expan-
sion of the characteristics for directors in a manner that could have
positive repercussions for increasing women board members.
Sarbanes-Oxley and related reforms require particular directors to
have financial background and experience. Thus, the NYSE,
NASDAQ and AMEX all require each audit committee member to be
"financially literate."' 54 In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley requires public
corporations to disclose whether their audit committee includes a fi-
nancial expert, and if it does not, to explain why such an expert is not
a member -of the committee.155 Such disclosure essentially ensures
that public corporations appoint a financial expert to the audit com-
mittee of their board. Under SEC guidelines, a director can qualify as
152. Press Release, Ctr. for Women's Bus. Research, Privately-Held, 50% or More Wo-
men-Owned Business in the United States, 2004: A Fact Sheet (2004), http://www.
womensbusinessresearch.org/mediacenter/nationalstatetrends/total.htm (last visited Jan.
20, 2006).
153. E.g., WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 9; CATALYST INC., WOMEN
OF COLOR IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT: THREE YEARS LATER 2 (2002).
154. See AMEX COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 47, § 121 (B) (2) (a) (ii); NASDAQ MARKET-
PLACE RULES, supra note 47, at 58; NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 47,
§ 303A.07(a).
155. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407(a), 116 Stat. 745, 790 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (Supp. II 2002)). This requirement is now embodied
in Item 401(h) of Regulation S-K of the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h) (2005).
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a financial expert if she has served as a CFO or in a position with
similar functions.156 This emphasis on financial experience could
have had positive repercussions for women because women appear to
be better represented in the financial industry. Indeed, women ac-
counted for nearly sixty percent of the accountant and auditor
workforce in 1999.117 Then too, there are certainly more CFOs than
CEOs at major corporations. Catalyst revealed that seven percent of
Fortune 500 companies have women CFOs, which compares favorably
to the little over one percent of women holding CEO titles. 151 Simi-
larly, 8.7% of S&P 500 companies have women CFOs.1" 9 Moreover,
the number of CFOs has grown more than twenty percent within the
past few years.1 60 Women in financial industries therefore appear to
reflect a significant pipeline.1 6 '
Unfortunately, the strong representation of women in financial
fields has not translated into greater board representation. Thus, only
nine women directors at Fortune 100 companies are CFOs. 16 2 More-
over, only one woman Fortune 100 director serves as a financial ex-
pert.1 63 Hence, the emphasis on financial experience does not
appear to have translated into increased board seats for women.
Interestingly, corporations already tend to expand their criteria
when searching for women directors, suggesting that such an expan-
sion may be a necessary, but not sufficient, solution. Hence, both wo-
men and people of color tend to have more varied backgrounds than
their white male counterparts. 6" The Fortune 100 Study indicated that
only sixty percent of companies with women directors have at least
one woman who is a current or former executive, as compared to
ninety-five percent and eighty-two percent respectively for men direc-
156. Id. § 229.401 (h) (3) (i).
157. Jennifer Caplan, The Glass Ceiling Continues to Shatter for Women CFOs, CFO.coM,
Feb. 1, 2001, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/2986994/c-2984338/?f=archives.
158. CENSUS OF WOMEN CORPORATE OFFICERS AND Top EARNERS, supra note 115, at 12-13.
159. Matt Krantz, More Women Take CFO Roles, USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 2004, at 3B.
160. Id. (citing Catalyst study).
161. See Sarra, supra note 59, at 487 (noting that the post-Enron focus on financial liter-
acy may be positive for women because they are better represented in the financial
industry).
162. See infta app. A, tbl.A4. Similarly, only six women within the next 150 Fortune
companies are CFOs. See infra app. C, tbl.C4.
163. See infra app. A, tbl.A5. Northrop Grumman Corp. identified Aulana Peters, for-
mer SEC Commissioner and a woman of color, as its financial expert. Northrop Grumman
Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 10-11 (Apr. 12, 2005).
164. Dan Ackman, Black Directors: Diversity Without Diversity, FORBES, Aug. 8, 2002, availa-
ble at http://www.forbes.com/2002/08/08/0808blackdirectors.html.
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tors.16 5 Instead, many women directors are either academics or heads
of nonprofit organizations. 166 Thus, corporations already have re-
laxed their over-reliance on executives when searching for women di-
rectors. Therefore, focusing on expanding director qualifications as a
solution for increasing women directors may not yield significant
results.
Also, de-emphasizing executive experience for women directors
may have drawbacks. If a significant number of women have back-
grounds distinct from their male counterparts, they may be perceived
as less qualified, playing into stereotypes that may undermine their
ability to be effective. Indicative of this problem, studies of boar-
droom dynamics indicate that directors with executive experience
command greater respect from other directors.' 6 7 If women do not
have such experience, then they may not be able to command such
respect thereby undermining their ability to be effective. Also, women
may actually benefit from executive experience, especially in the new
corporate governance era. While we may question the wisdom of hav-
ing boards comprised almost entirely of current or former executives,
studies suggest that with regard to some circumstances, greater execu-
tive experience and expertise may enhance the corporation's effec-
tiveness.168 Then too, board members, particularly today's board
members, need an understanding of complex financial transactions
that people from the nonprofit or academic sector may not be
equipped to understand. While certainly companies can invest re-
sources to educate directors, these observations indicate that women
directors may be handicapped if they stem exclusively or primarily
from nonbusiness-oriented backgrounds. In this regard, while en-
couraging corporations to expand their criteria for directors may
prove a useful method of increasing women directors, that expansion
must be tempered so that it does not do more harm than good.
165. See infra app. A, tbl.A4; cf. KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 12 (documenting
the board composition of the Fortune 1000 companies).
166. See infta app. A, tbl.A4. Indeed, twenty women were heads of nonprofits, while
twenty were academics, mainly professors or deans of business schools. See infra app. A,
tbl.A4. Similarly, within the next 150 Fortune companies, twenty served as heads of non-
profits, while thirty were academics and another twenty-three were former government
officials. See infra app. C, tbl.C4.
167. E.g., Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mecha-
nism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 898, 951 (1996).
168. Id.
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C. Encouraging Corporations to Promote from Within
Another possible reform for increasing women directors is to en-
courage corporations to promote directors from their own managerial
ranks. Indeed, studies indicate that there are a considerable number
of women managers below the top level. 169 Because corporations
tend to rely upon top-level executives, these managers tend to be over-
looked by other corporate boards. However, while such managers
may not have the experience to serve as directors on other companies'
boards, they do have some business knowledge and expertise regard-
ing their own company that could make them significant contributors
to that board. Hence, encouraging corporations to promote from
within may counteract the over-reliance on executives without sacrific-
ing the experience women need for their board service. This strategy
also makes mentoring and networking a less significant stumbling
block because, by virtue of their promotions within the company, ex-
ecutives are already familiar with these women managers and appar-
ently already believe that such managers have business expertise.
Another advantage to this strategy is that it can create an alterna-
tive pipeline into other boards. Board memberships beget other
board memberships. This is underscored by the fact that most board
members tend to hold multiple directorships. Hence, promoting wo-
men managers to directorships within the corporation can serve as a
pipeline of outside directors for other boards, informally training
them for those outside responsibilities. In this way, corporations can
harness the gender diversity that already appears to exist within the
corporation, increasing the ranks of women directors on their own
board, while operating as a springboard for other boards.
However, given the current emphasis away from inside directors,
it may be difficult to encourage corporations to promote from within.
Based on the notion that independent/outside directors serve as bet-
ter monitors of corporate affairs, possibly reducing corporate miscon-
duct, reforms have focused on ensuring greater director
independence within various committees and on the board as a
whole.170 In response, corporations have not just a majority, but a
super-majority of independent directors.' 7 1 Korn/Ferry reveals that
the average corporation only has two inside directors. 172 This pattern
holds true for women directors. Indeed, the Fortune 100 Study re-
169. E.g., WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP, supra note 92, at 1.
170. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
171. KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 11.
172. Id.
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vealed that only four women directors at Fortune 100 companies were
insiders.17 Such a pattern may make it more difficult to implement a
promotion-from-within strategy.
Then too, this strategy could have the effect of marginalizing wo-
men directors. Indeed, because such committee membership re-
quires independence,174 being an inside director would automatically
disqualify women from serving on key committees within the corpora-
tion, including the audit committee. Moreover, if inside directors are
viewed as less desirable and women tended to be inside directors, then
they may be viewed as less desirable, undercutting their effectiveness.
These observations reflect significant drawbacks in this solution.
On the other hand, encouraging companies to promote from
within could enhance the pool of available women candidates and sig-
nificantly open up the pipeline for women directors. Because of this
possibility, this strategy may represent an important component of the
solution for increasing women's board service. Indeed, even if women
inside directors cannot serve on certain committees, there are others
such as the corporate governance committee, finance committee, or
executive committee on which such women directors could serve that
are also important to a corporation's effectiveness. Then too, corpo-
rations can balance out the exclusion of inside women directors from
certain committees by relying upon outside women directors for those
committees, ensuring a more robust representation on all
committees.
Each of the solutions identified in this Part have both merits and
drawbacks. Hence, this Part demonstrates not only that the imple-
mentation of any strategy requires a careful balance of the risks and
rewards, but also that unclogging the pipelines requires a combina-
tion of strategies. Regardless of which one or ones we rely upon, cor-
porations and diversity advocates need to be proactive if they want to
ensure a better representation of women on the board.
IV. CONCLUSION
Considering how it began, the story regarding women directors
may be more positive than negative. Most companies have at least one
woman director, and their presence is even greater at the top public
companies. Many of those companies have multiple women directors.
Then too, it appears that those women directors are not being
173. See infta app. A, tbl.A5.
174. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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marginalized, but act as chairs and serve on some of the most power-
ful committees on the board.
However, evidence suggests that there remains work to be done
in order to ensure that women's percentages on boards better reflect
their presence in the workforce as a whole. Indeed, women account
for about half of the labor force and at least one third of the college
and graduate school population. From this perspective, the fact that
they hold only about thirteen percent of board seats is troubling.
This evidence is more troubling when we consider that women
directors bring important economic and moral benefits to the board.
Indeed, women do not simply perform well, but they also may en-
hance a corporation's profitability by encouraging marketing and em-
ployment strategies that reach out to a corporation's more diverse
employment and customer base as well as contributing to the diversity
of views in the boardroom, which enhances the board's decision-
making and monitoring capabilities. While there are certainly factors
that inhibit women's ability to deliver these economic benefits to the
board, they do not detract from the notion that gender diversity is an
advantage in the boardroom. The empirical evidence on women's
board membership reveals that corporations are not doing enough to
ensure that they harness this advantage.
This Article reveals that the lack of women directors stems in sig-
nificant part from corporations' reliance on executives to fill their
board seats, and the fact that women do not have a significant pres-
ence at the executive level. This lack of executive presence generates
a clog in the pipeline from women's labor participation to their board
participation. As Part III indicates, there are many possible solutions
to enhancing women directorships, all of which have drawbacks and
merits. However, possibly the most important solution may be bring-
ing these problems to light so that men and women can have an open
and honest dialogue about the ways to resolve them.
[VOL. 65:579
2006] WOMEN DIRECTORS & BARRIERS TO THEIR ADVANCEMENT 611
APPENDIX A
STUDY OF FORTUNE 100 BOARDS
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study reflects data regarding women directors at Fortune
100 companies. The Fortune 100 companies were identified from the
April 2005 list of Fortune 100 companies in Fortune Magazine. Data on
board members was gathered from the most recent proxy statements
and other relevant SEC filings of such corporations as well as corpo-
rate websites and corporate press releases. Data is based on informa-"
tion collected from all Fortune 100 companies. TIAA-CREF has four
boards: TIAA has a board of trustees and a board of overseers while
CREF has a board of overseers and a board of trustees. The board of
overseers is comprised of the same directors for both entities and in-
cludes one woman elected in 2000. The board of trustees, however, is
comprised of two different sets of members. However, since the
board of trustees at both companies performs tasks most similar to a
traditional board of directors, this study includes data from each of
those boards of trustees. In addition, because the data on TIAA-CREF
reflects information on both boards, this study actually encompasses
101 corporate boards.
KEY FINDINGS
" Women hold 199 or approximately 16% of the total available board
seats at Fortune 100 companies (Table Al)
* Forty-five percent of women directors currently serving at Fortune
100 companies were elected in the last five years (Table AI.1)
• Ninety-seven percent or all but three Fortune 100 companies have
at least one woman director on their board (Table A2)
" Women are most likely to serve on the audit committee and the
compensation committee of their board (Table A3)
* Roughly one third of all women directors are current CEOs or pres-
idents, while close to half of all women directors are either current
or former CEOs or presidents (Table A4)
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TABLE Al: BOARD COMPOSITION BY GENDER
Gender Total Seats Held' 7 5  % of Total Seats
Men 1008 83.6%
Women 199 16.4%
Total Men and Women 1207 100.0%
TABLE AI.I: WOMEN DIREcToRs ELECTED WITHIN
PREvious FIVE YEARS
Recently Elected
Number of Recently Elected Nonreplacement
Number of Women Elected as Directors % of Directors % of
Election Women Directors Nonreplacerent Total Women Total Women
Years Elected Directors Directors Directors
2000-2002 44 18 22.2% 9%
2003-2005 46 21 23.1% 10.6%
TABLE A1.2: MOST RECENTLY ELECTED WOMEN DIRECTORS
Number of Nonreplacement
Number of Directors Elected Directors Elected to Boards
to Boards Already Having at Already Having at Least
Election Years Least One Woman Director One Director
2003-2005 33 20
175. Because several women hold multiple seats both on boards within the Fortune 100
and on boards within the Fortune 500 and other corporations, the number of seats held by
women does not reflect the actual number of women who serve on boards. For example,
Shirley Ann Jackson, president of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, sits on six boards,
including three boards of corporations in the Fortune 100-Marathon Oil Corp. (#31),
AT&T Corp. (#56), and FedEx Corp. (#78). Similarly, Carla A. Hills, chairman and CEO
of Hills & Co., sits on three Fortune 100 boards including ChevronTexaco Corp. (#6),
American International Group, Inc. (#9), and Time Warner Inc. (#32).
176. "Nonreplacement directors" refer to women directors whose election does not
correspond with the retirement of another woman director on the board.
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TABLE A2: NUMBER OF WOMEN DIRECTORS BY COMPANY 1 7 7








TABLE A2.1: CORPORATIONS WITH LARGEST NUMBER OF
WOMEN DIRECTORS
Total Number Number of % of Women
Corporation of Board Seats Women Directors Directors on Board
Johnson &Johnson 12 4 33.3%
TIAA-CREF 13 4 30.7%
Wells Fargo & Co. 14 5 35.7%
WellPoint Inc. 17 5 29.4%
SBC Commc'ns Inc. 14 6 42.8%
Albertson's, Inc. 11 6 54.5%
TABLE A3: MOST PREVALENT COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP OF
WOMEN DIRECTORS







177. Includes both boards of TLAA and CREF, totaling 101 corporate boards.
178. Includes Honeywell International, News Corp., and Plains All American Pipeline,
LLC, the corporate general partner of Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. See app. B.
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TABLE A3.1: ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE DATA
Companies with at least One woman on
the audit committee 60
Number of committee chairs held by
women 54
TABLE A4: MOST COMMON OCCUPATIONS OF WOMEN DIRECTORS
% of Women
Occupations Number of Women in Occupation
Current CEO/COO/president 67 33.6%
Former CEO/COO/president 28 14.1%
Nonprofit manager/director 20 10%
Academic 20 10%
Former government official 16 8%
CFO 9 4.5%
TABLE A4.1: ADDITIONAL OCCUPATIONAL DATA
Companies with at least One woman
current or former CEO/COO/president 60
TABLE A5: OTHER BOARD CHARACrERISTICS
Characteristic Number of Women
Inside Director 4
Lead Director 1
Chair of Board 1
Financial Expert 1
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APPENDIX B
STUDY OF FORTUNE 100 BOARDS
LIST OF FORTUNE 100 COMPANIES
Total
Total Number
Number of of Women
Rank Company Name Directors Directors
1 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 14 2
2 Exxon Mobil Corp. 11 2
3 Gen. Motors Corp. 12 2
4 Ford Motor Co. 15 3
5 Gen. Elec. Co. 16 3
6 ChevronTexaco Corp. 12 1
7 ConocoPhillips 13 3
8 Citigroup Inc. 16 3
9 Am. Int'l Group 18 2
10 IBM Corp. 13 2
11 Hewlett-Packard Co. 10 2
12 Berkshire Hathaway 11 1
13 Home Depot, Inc. 12 1
14 Verizon Commc'ns 11 1
15 McKesson Corp. 10 3
16 Cardinal Health, Inc. 13 1
17 Altria Group, Inc. 12 1
18 Bank of Am. Corp. 17 2
19 State Farm Ins. Cos. 13 3
20 JPMorgan Chase & Co. 16 1
21 The Kroger Co. 14 2
22 Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. 9 1
23 AmerisourceBergen Corp. 9 1
24 Pfizer Inc. 14 2
25 The Boeing Co. 11 2
26 The Procter & Gamble Co. 15 2
27 Target Corp. 11 3
28 Dell, Inc. 10 1
29 Costco Wholesale Corp. 13 2
30 Johnson &Johnson 12 4
31 Marathon Oil Corp. 11 1
32 Time Warner Inc. 13 1
33 SBC Commc'ns Inc. 14 6
Total
Total Number
Number of of Women
Rank Company Name Directors Directors
34 The Dow Chem. Co. 14 2
35 Albertson's, Inc. 11 6
36 Morgan Stanley 11 1
37 MetLife, Inc. 15 3
38 Walgreen Co. 10 1
39 United Techs. Corp. 12 3
40 UnitedHealth Group 12 2
41 Microsoft Corp. 9 1
42 United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. 10 3
43 Lowe's Cos. 12 1
44 Archer Daniels Midland Co. 9 1
45 Sears, Roebuck & Co. 10 2
46 Safeway Inc. 9 2
47 Lockheed Martin Corp. 13 2
48 Medco Health Solutions, Inc. 9 1
49 Motorola, Inc. 12 2
50 Intel Corp. 10 2
51 The Allstate Corp. 13 2
52 Wells Fargo & Co. 14 5
53 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 10 3
54 The Walt Disney Co. 12 2
55 CVS Corps. 9 2
56 AT&T Corp. 10 2
57 Caterpillar Inc. 14 1
58 Northrop Grumman Corp. 10 1
59 Goldman, Sachs & Co. 10 2
60 SYSCO Corp. 12 3
61 PepsiCo, Inc. 13 3
62 Am. Express Co. 12 2
63 Delphi Corp. 12 1
64 Prudential Fin., Inc. 11 1
65 Wachovia Corp. 18 2
66 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (DuPont) 11 2
67 Sprint Nextel Corp. (Sprint) 13 2
68 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. 15 2
69 Viacom Int'l Inc. 12 1
70 Int'l Paper Co. 9 1
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Total
Total Number
Number of of Women
Rank Company Name Directors Directors
71 Johnson Controls, Inc. 12 1
72 Tyson Foods, Inc. 9 2
73 Caremark Inc. 12 2
74 J.C. Penney Co. 10 2
75 Honeywell Int'l Inc. 14 0
76 Ingram Micro Inc. 10 2
77 Best Buy Co., Inc. 12 1
78 FedEx Corp. 13 2
79 Alcoa Inc. 9 2
80 HCA Inc. 14 2
81 TIAA 179  13 4
81 CREF 6 2
82 Sunoco, Inc. 11 2
83 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 13 2
84 Merck & Co. 12 3
85 The St. Paul Travelers Cos. 13 3
86 Duke Energy Corp. 10 1
87 BellSouth Corp. 10 2
88 The Hartford Fin. Serv. 10 1
89 Weyerhaeuser Co. 11 2
90 MCI, Inc. 9 1
91 Cisco Sys., Inc. 13 2
92 The Coca-Cola Co. 14 2
93 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 11 2
94 Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. 10 2
95 Elec. Data Sys. 12 1
96 Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P. 180  8 0
97 WellPoint, Inc. 17 5
98 News Corp. 14 0
99 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 12 2
100 Abbott Labs. 14 2
179. TIAA-CREF is ranked 81. For purposes of this study, the two boards of trustees for
TIAA-CREF are analyzed separately.




ADDITIONAL DATA ON FORTUNE 101-250 BOARDS
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study reflects data regarding women directors at Fortune
companies from 101-250 as identified from the April 2005 list of For-
tune 500 companies in Fortune Magazine. Data on board members was
gathered from the most recent proxy statements and other relevant
SEC filings of such corporations as well as corporate websites and cor-
porate press releases. Data was located on all companies other than
The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., for which no public
data was available. Thus, the study actually encompasses data on 149
boards.
TABLE Cl: BOARD COMPOSITION BY GENDER
Gender Total Seats Held % of Total Seats
Men 1367 84.3%
Women 255 15.7%
Total Men and Women 1622 100.0%
TABLE C2: NUMBER OF WOMEN DIREcToRs BY COMPANY' 8 1








181. Excludes information on The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. (#124) for
which no public data was available.
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TABLE C3: MOST PREvALENT COMMITrEE MEMBERSHIP OF WOMEN
DIRECTORS AND WOMEN CHAIRS
Number of Women Serving








TABLE C4: MOST COMMON OCCUPATIONS OF WOMEN DIRECTORS
% of Women
Occupations Number of Women in Occupation
Current CEO/COO/president 89 34.9%
Former CEO/COO/president 30 11.7%
Nonprofit manager/director 20 7.8%
Academic 30 11.7%
Former government official 23 9%
CFO 6 2.3%
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 65:579
TABLE C5: LIST OF FORTUNE 101-250 COMPANIES
Total
Total Number
Number of of Women
Rank Company Name Directors Directors
101 Halliburton Co. 9 1
102 Comcast Corp. 12 1
103 Raytheon Co. 11 2
104 Supervalu Inc. 10 2
105 3M Co. 11 3
106 Deere & Co. 13 2
107 Cendant Corp. 15 4
108 Aetna Inc. 11 3
109 Ga.-Pac. Corp. 14 2
110 Tech Data Corp. 8 1
111 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 15 2
112 AutoNation, Inc. 7 1
113 Sears Holdings Corp. 10 1
114 Sara Lee Corp. 13 4
115 Gen. Dynamics Corp. 12 0
116 McDonald's Corp. 13 2
117 Publix Super Markets, Inc. 10 4
118 Visteon Corp. 9 2
119 Am. Airlines, Inc. (AMR) 13 2
120 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 11 3
121 ConAgra Foods, Inc. 13 1
122 CIGNA Corp. 10 4
123 Coca-Cola Enters. Inc. 13 1
124 The Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. No information
available
125 Wyeth 10 2
126 Amerada Hess Corp. 12 2
127 Lear Corp. 11 1
128 Rite Aid Corp. 10 1
129 United Air Lines, Inc. (UAL) 12 1
130 Gap Inc. 13 3
131 Washington Mut., Inc. 13 3
132 Xerox Corp. 11 2
133 Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. 9 2
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Total
Total Number
Number of of Women
Rank Company Name Directors Directors
134 Emerson Elec. Co. 14 1
135 Kimberly-Clark Corp. 10 3
136 Premcor Inc. 8 1
137 Express Scripts, Inc. 11 1
138 Delta Air Lines, Inc. 9 2
139 Anheuser-Busch Cos. 15 2
140 Manpower Inc. 11 2
141 TJX Cos. 11 2
142 Computer Scis. Corp. 10 0
143 U.S. Bancorp 12 1
144 Loews Corp. 11 1
145 Exelon Corp. 15 2
146 Staples, Inc. 12 2
147 The May Dep't Stores Co. 10 3
148 Am. Elec. Power Co. 11 1
149 U.S. Steel Corp. 12 1
150 Countrywide Fin. Corp. 12 1
151 Dominion Res., Inc. 15 1
152 Eli Lilly & Co. 12 3
153 Eastman Kodak Co. 13 3
154 Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. 11 1
155 The Progressive Corp. 11 1
156 Office Depot, Inc. 12 3
157 Nextel Commc'ns, Inc. 8 2
158 AFLAC Inc. 17 2
159 OMX, Inc. 13 4
160 Whirlpool Corp. 11 2
161 The Chubb Corp. 13 3
162 Humana Inc. 7 1
163 FirstEnergy Corp. 13 3
164 Solectron Corp. 9 1
165 Williams Cos. 11 2
166 Tex. Instruments Inc. 12 4
167 Constellation Energy Group, Inc. 13 2




Number of of Women
Rank Company Name Directors Directors
169 Tenet Healthcare Corp. 9 2
170 Masco Corp. 9 1
171 MBNA Corp. 9 2
172 PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. 10 2
173 Nike, Inc. 11 2
174 Union Pac. Corp. 11 1
175 Sanmina-SCI Corp. 8 1
176 Marsh & McLennan Cos. 11 2
177 Tesoro Corp. 8 0
178 TRW Auto. Inc. 9 1
179 The Directv, Inc. 10 0
180 Southern Co. 10 1
181 Pulte Homes, Inc. 10 1
182 Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. 10 1
183 Ill. Tool Works Inc. 9 1
184 Kohl's Corp. 13 2
185 Health Net, Inc. 8 1
186 Occidental Petroleum Corp. 12 1
187 Edison Int'l 10 1
188 PACCAR Inc. 9 0
189 Nucor Corp. 8 1
190 Nw. Airlines Corp. 14 1
191 USAA 15 2
192 Toys "R" Us, Inc. 10 3
193 TransMontaigne Inc. 8 0
194 Sun Microsystems, Inc. 9 1
195 TXU Corp. 10 1
196 PG&E Corp. 10 2
197 Gen. Mills, Inc. 12 4
198 CHS Inc. 17 0
199 Pub. Serv. Enter. Group Inc. 9 2
200 Burlington Nor. Santa Fe Corp. 10 1
201 Dana Corp. 10 2
202 The Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. 11 4
203 D.R. Horton, Inc. 7 1
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Total
Total Number
Number of of Women
Rank Company Name Directors Directors
204 Centex Corp. 10 1
205 Dean Foods Co. 14 1
206 Capital One Fin. Corp. 7 1
207 Arrow Electronics, Inc. 9 2
208 UnumProvident Corp. 12 2
209 CenterPoint Energy Inc. 8 0
210 Colgate-Palmolive Co. 9 3
211 Nat'l City Corp. 12 2
212 Amgen Inc. 13 1
213 FPL Group, Inc. 11 1
214 Lennar Corp. 9 1
215 The Gillette Co. 11 2
216 Textron Inc. 12 1
217 Avnet, Inc. 9 2
218 Aon Corp. 13 2
219 ARAMARK Corp. 11 1
220 Oracle Corp. 11 1
221 Entergy Corp. 13 3
222 Smithfield Foods, Inc. 8 1
223 First Data Corp. 11 2
224 Marriott Int'l, Inc. 11 2
225 UnitedAuto Group, Inc. 12 1
226 The AES Corp. 11 2
227 Eaton Corp. 10 1
228 Consol. Edison Inc. 11 3
229 Progress Energy, Inc. 12 2
230 Omnicom Group Inc. 11 2
231 Circuit City Stores, Inc. 11 4
232 Continental Airlines, Inc. 11 1
233 Navistar Int'l Corp. 10 1
234 Kellogg Co. Int'l 12 2
235 Sempra Energy 12 1
236 PPG Indus., Inc. 10 2
237 Baxter Int'l Inc. 11 2
238 Am. Standard Cos. 8 1
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Total
Total Number
Number of of Women
Rank Company Name Directors Directors
239 Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc. 10 1
240 Limited Brands Inc. 13 3
241 Fluor Corp. 10 2
242 Calpine Corp. 9 3
243 Devon Energy Corp. 11 0
244 ArvinMeritor, Inc. 14 2
245 Genuine Parts Co. 11 2
246 Medtronic, Inc. 10 2
247 Lucent Techs. Inc. 10 2
248 Int'l Steel Group, Inc. 6 0
249 Yum! Brands, Inc. 12 2
250 Reliant Energy Inc. 7 1
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